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SOME CONFUSING MATTERS RELATING TO
ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA *
By WESLEY A. STURGES I and STEPHEN B. IVES, JR. j
A review of the Pennsylvania decisions relating to arbitration
under the arbitration statute of 1927 points up several issues which are
of importance to those who may be concerned with arbitration in either
commercial or labor controversies. Some of these issues result in part
from frailties of draftsmanship of the statute and in part from views
advanced by the Supreme Court in the course of litigation involving
those frailties. Others have accrued more directly from the case law
made by the Supreme Court without special reference to uncertainties
of statutory text.
The Supreme Court has varied from time to time in its expres-
sions of its attitude and approach toward the statute and toward arbi-
tration and arbitration agreements, leaving in doubt whether in a
new case it will approach the statute and the arbitral process with pur-
pose to facilitate their service as a legitimate servant of law administra-
tion or seek to restrict it.
In 1928 in one of the earliest decisions under the statute, the Court
saw fit to comment as to its favorable intendment toward the arbitral
process as follows: "Where parties to an executory contract agree to
submit the matter in dispute to a named individual, they are bound by
their contract . . ., and this rule is now applicable, under the Act of
April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, where the contract provides for arbitration,
but the arbitrators are not named. It is clear every reasonable intend-
ment will be made in favor of the validity of such agreements.":' (Italics
* The substance of the present monograph is now planned by Dean Sturges to
constitute a part of his forthcoming text on arbitration.j Dean, Yale Law School. Author, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARns
(1930).
t Student, Yale Law School.
1. Bashford v. West Miami Land Co., 295 Pa. 560, 568, 145 AtI. 678, 681
(1928). See Britex Waste Co., Ltd., v. Schwab & Sons, Inc., 139 Pa. Super.
474, 12 A.2d 473 (1939) ; Couzens v. Wachtel, 64 Pa. D. & C. 459 (1948).
(727)
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supplied). On the other hand, in 1950 in McDevitt v. McDevitt, the
Court declared that "'Arbitration agreements are strictly construed and
are not to be extended by implication." 2 In 1934 the Court, while con-
sidering a question involving the enforceability under the statute of a
provision for arbitration in a commercial contract, voiced it as being
a "legal principle that it is our duty to sustain the act, if this can rea-
sonably be done, and not to destroy it either in whole or in part." 8
But in an opinion in 1935 " the Court saw fit expressly to indicate its
judicial apprehension toward the arbitral process. Said the Court:
"The parties elected to submit their disputes to arbitration. This
method of trying issues of fact and law is now somewhat in fashion.
It may well be that after other experiences such as the present litigants
have had, it will be determined that the ancient method of trial in duly
2. 365 Pa. 18, 23, 73 A.2d 394, 397 (1950). To the foregoing text the Court
cited J. S. Cornell & Son, Inc., v. Rosenwald, 339 Pa. 18, 13 A.2d 716 (1940);
Margolies v. Zimmerman, 341 Pa. 493, 19 A.2d 737 (1941). In J. S. Cornell & Son,
Inc., v. Rosenwald, supra, the Court observed as follows: "The rule is that arbitra-
tion agreements are strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication.
In Jacob v. Weisser, 207 Pa. 484, 489, 56 AUt. 1065, in limiting the jurisdiction of
an architect, the court quoted Chandley Bros. v. Cambridge Springs, 200 Pa. 230, 49
Atl. 772, that 'The terms of the agreement are not to be strained to discover it. They
must be clear and unmistakable to oust the jurisdiction of the courts; for trial byjury cannot be taken away by implication merely in any case."' Id. at 23, 13 A.2d
at 717. In the Margolies case, supra, the Court repeated that "The rule is that arbi-
tration agreements are strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication."
Id. at 496, 19 A.2d at 738. Compare the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo for the ma-jority of the New York Court of Appeals with the opinion of Crane J., dissenting, in
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929), appeal
dismissed, 282 U.S. 808 (1930).
For a case attempting to blend the favorable approach to arbitration of Bash-
ford v. West Miami Land Co., supra note 1, with the strict construction doctrine
of the cases cited supra, see Win. Linker Co., Inc. v. Feinberg, 360 Pa. 601, 62 A.2d
839 (1949). See also Schreiber v. Ostroff, 65 Pa. D. & C. 601 (1948).
Whatever basis there may have been for strict construction of arbitration pro-
visions at common law, whether in furtherance of a principle that "trial by jury
cannot be taken away by implication merely," or otherwise, it is of dubious applica-
bility to arbitration provisions which qualify under the statute. This is true because
§ 163 of the statute provides an orderly judicial procedure for determining the scope
of the provision (by the court if jury trial is waived; otherwise by jury). See, e.g.,
Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 Atl. 43 (1938) ; justice
Stern, concurring in J. S. Cornell & Son, Inc., v. Rosenwald, supra; Stofflet &
Tillotson v. Chester Hous. Auth., 346 Pa. 574, 31 A.2d 274 (1943); Ellwood City
Motor Coach Co. v. Ellwood City Traction Workers' Union, 67 Pa. D. & C. 401(1948). Furthermore, § 171(d) provides for judicial review of an arbitration and
award to determine whether or not the award "is against the law, and is such that
had it been a verdict of the jury the court would have entered different or otherjudgment notwithstanding the verdict." While the purport of this subsection and
the practicability of administering it are questioned below, its existence in the
statute and the effect already given to it by the Supreme Court prompt caution in
posing the applicability of the rule of strict construction of arbitration provisons as
declared at common law to arbitration provisions which qualify under the statute and
become subject to the foregoing sections of the statute.
3. Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd., v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, 449, 170 At.
286, 289 (1934).
4. Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 179 Atl. 558 (1935).
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constituted courts of law is a more satisfactory way to settle contro-
versies. This is for further experience to demonstrate." r
The arbitration statute 6 purports to embrace (1) provisions in
written contracts, except contracts for personal services, to settle by
arbitration controversies which may thereafter arise out of the contract,
or out of the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, and (2)
written agreements of submission of any controversies existing between
the parties at the time of the agreement. The statute declares that such
arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable
(§ 161) and provides remedies to effectuate the declaration. These in-
clude motion proceedings to stay the trial of any action, suit or proceed-
ing brought upon a cause embraced in such agreements (§ 162), to re-
quire a recalcitrant party to proceed in accord with the arbitration agree-
ment (§ 163), and to procure court appointment of arbitrators when a
party fails or refuses to participate in the original appointment or in
filling a vacancy on the arbitral board (§ 164). Provisions also are
made for the confirmation, correction and vacation of awards in motion
proceedings (§§ 169, 170, 171). Accordingly, the statute follows the
general scope and pattern of the general arbitration statutes of Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and
Wisconsin, and the United States Arbitration Act.
5. Id. at 339, 179 AtI. at 561. Concerning the tradition of the arbitral process
and its judicial reputability in Pennsylvania, see Noble v. Peebles, 13 S. & R. 319
(Pa. 1825); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Fenlon, 4 W. & S. 205 (Pa. 1842);
Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Ad. 869 (1913). See also Note, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 885 (1914).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 161-181 (PS 1930). This statute will be referred
to hereinafter by section number only.
The general arbitration statute was first enacted in 1927 (Laws 1927, Act. No.
248, §§ 1-19, approved April 25, 1927). Present §§ 162 and 175 became effective
by amendment of the corresponding original sections (§§ 2, 15) in 1935 (Laws 1935,
Act No. 400 approved June 21, 1935). Sections 180 and 181 as now included were
enacted before the general statute in 1925 (Laws 1925, Act No. 670, approved May 13,
1925).
Section 180 also has been declared repealed by implication. Phila. Hous. Auth.
v. Turner Const. Co., 343 Pa. 512, 23 A.2d 426 (1942). Reported infra, p. 745 et seq.
The constitutionality of the statute was sustained in Katakura & Co., Ltd., v.
Vogue S.H. Co., 307 Pa. 544, 161 AUt. 529 (1932). The grounds of the challenge
and the rulings thereon are reported by the Court as follows: "We overrule defend-
ant's contention as to the unconstitutionality of the Arbitration Act of 1927. The
act is not special legislation within the meaning of article III, section 7, of the Con-
stitution of Pennsylvania: Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221; Com. v.
Puder, 261 Pa. 129. It is not unconstitutional as an abridgement of the right of
trial by jury as it does not provide for compulsory arbitration: Cutter and Hinds
v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195." Id. at 549, 161 Atl. at 530.
In J. M. Davis Co. v. Shaler Twp., 332 Pa. 134, 2 A.2d 708 (1938), another
suggestion of unconstitutionality was advanced. It was argued that court appoint-
ment of an arbitrator upon an application under § 164 of the statute in substitution
for an arbitrator named in an arbitration provision who had become disqualified was
unconstitutional, since the parties had made no provision in their agreement for
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EFFECT OF THE GENERAL STATUTE UPON COMMON LAW
ARBITRATION
There is no provision in the general statute which expressly
reserves or outlaws the privilege of parties to arbitrate outside the
statute as at common law. The Supreme Court, however, has declared
from time to time that the statute does not displace common law
arbitration.7 It also may be noted that § 166 recognizes arbitrations
outside the statute. It provides that "the arbitrators selected, either
as prescribed in this act or otherwise, may summon in writing any
person to attend before them . . . as a witness." (Italics supplied.)
If the arbitration agreement is oral, rather than written, it seems
clear that the agreement and proceedings and award thereunder will be
judged at common law.' If the agreement is written, and thereby
formally complies with the statute, but the controversy to be arbitrated
thereunder is deemed not to be arbitrable under the statute, apparently
the agreement and any award thereunder will be judged at common
law.' If an arbitration agreement qualifies as to form and as to the
arbitrability of the cause under the statute, but the parties stipulate
that the statute shall not apply, it seems probable that the stipulation
of the parties will generally be honored." Again, in certain cases,"
any such substitution. The Supreme Court rejected this argument saying that when
the parties entered into an arbitration provision qualifying under the statute they
thereby invoked all of the remedies therein provided-"they voluntarily placed in
the hands of the court the power it exercised and neither party can now successfully
challenge the exercise of that power." Id. at 140, 2 A.2d at 711.
7. Isaac v. Donegal & Conoy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 351, 152 At. 95 (1930);
Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 Atl. 43 (1938) ; Sukonik v.
Shapiro, 333 Pa. 289, 5 A.2d 108 (1939); Rosenbaum v. Drucker, 346 Pa. 434, 31
A.2d 117 (1943) ; Scheckter v. Rubin, 362 Pa. 187, 66 A.2d 777 (1949). That this
is the prevailing view in other jurisdictions see STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS
AND AWARDS § 1 (1930).
Compare, however, J. M. Davis Co. v. Shaler Twp. supra note 6, in which the
Supreme Court remarked that arbitrations growing out of arbitration agreements
made after the act of 1927 "must be proceeded with according to the terms of that
statute. . . . When the parties entered into the arbitration agreement now before
us they ipso facto embodied in that agreement all of the provisions of the Arbi-
tration Act." Id. at 138, 2 A.2d at 710. Although this case is distinguishable on
the grounds that § 176 of the statute was involved, since one of the parties was a
subdivision of the Commonwealth, the opinion made no reference to that section,
and the case has been broadly applied-though with some hesitation-by lower courts
in cases between private litigants. Kuzman v. Kamien, 139 Pa. Super. 538, 12 A.2d
471 (1940) (judicial review of award); Couzens v. Wachtel, 64 Pa. D. & C. 459
(1948) (court appointment of arbitrator before award rendered).
8. Scholler Bros., Inc., v. Hagen Corp., 158 Pa. Super. 170, 44 A.2d 321 (1945).
9. Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 At. 43 (1938).
10. In several cases a stipulation that arbitration be c6nducted under the statute
has been noticed by the Court. E.g., Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332,
179 Atl. 558 (1935).
11. Sukonik v. Shapiro, 333 Pa. 289, 5 A.2d 108 (1939) ; Rosenbaum v. Drucker,
346 Pa. 434, 31 A.2d 117 (1943); Scheckter v. Rubin, 362 Pa. 187, 66 A.2d 777
(1949).
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although the arbitration agreement was in writing and the controversy
seems to have been arbitrable under the statute, the Supreme Court
appears to have concluded from the actions of the parties with respect
to the proceedings or award that they intended to forego the statute,
and, accordingly, the proceedings and award were judged as at common
law. It was not made clear, however, what conduct of the parties in
the particular case justified this conclusion, nor why it should be so
construed.1
2
WHETHER THE STATUTE OR COMMON LAW IS PREFERABLE
Parties concerned with the use of arbitration and arbitration agree-
ments in Pennsylvania will find it difficult to determine whether it is
more expedient to conform to the statute if they can or to proceed at
common law. If they desire to use a written arbitration agreement
and have it and the proceedings and award at common law rather than
under the statute, caution will prompt them to stipulate expressly to
that effect in the agreement."3
It is true that there are advantages to be gained under the general
statute whereby qualifying agreements are made valid, irrevocable and
enforceable by the specified remedies; and the motion proceedings
therein provided to enforce, correct and vacate awards are likely to be
superior to those at common law. Formal requirements to qualify an
arbitration agreement under the statute and other provisions of the
statute governing the arbitral proceedings and the award are scarcely
more exacting than common law rules.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested, if
not decided, in Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union " a drastic limi-
tation upon the kind of controversies which may be arbitrated under the
statute. The statute, it has been declared, "is not broad enough in its
scope, and apparently was not esigned, to cover arbitration proceed-
ings where the remedy sought and awarded is a mandatory decree." 1,
Again, awards appear to be stripped of their common law finality
and conclusiveness by § 171 (d) of the statute which provides that an
12. In both Sukonik v. Shapiro and Rosenbaum v. Drucker, mipra note 11, the
parties evidenced their selection of commwi law procedure by bringing independent
actions to enforce the award, rather than using the statutory motion procedure. In
the Rosenbaum case, the Court remarked, "As neither side attempted, in any par-
ticular, to follow the Arbitration Act, it is manifest that the award of the arbitra-
tors was a common law award." Id. at 436, 31 A.2d at 118. No other guides have
been found.
13. See infra, p. 744 et seq.
14. 328 Pa. 385, 196 At. 43 (1938).
15. Id. at 388, 196 Atl. at 45. (Italics supplied). See discussion of this case at
p. 732 infra.
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arbitration and award are subject to judicial review to determine if the
award "is against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the
jury the court would have entered different or other judgment not-
withstanding the verdict." (Italics supplied.) Whether or not this
subsection can be effectively waived by agreement of the parties has not
been determined. This matter is reviewed below.
The foregoing cause for judicial review of arbitration and awards
is accorded by the statute in addition to the provisions in § 177 whereby
the arbitrators, or the parties to the arbitration with the approval of the
arbitrators, may make application under the declaratory judgments act,
at any time during the arbitral proceedings, for the determination of
any legal question.
If the view of the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. Garment
Workers' Union imposes an indefinite, but apparently substantial, re-
striction upon what controversies may be covered by arbitration agree-
ments under the statute, and if it shall be determined that § 171 (d)
may not be effectively waived by stipulation, it seems probable that
parties will often find it more expedient to proceed at common law
rather than invoke the statute."0
CAUSES WHICH MAY BE SUBMITTED UNDER TIE STATUTE
By the first section of the statute (§ 161), parties may include a
provision in a written contract (except a contract for "personal serv-
ices") to arbitrate "a controversy" thereafter arising in connection
with the contract, and they may by agreement of submission in writing
embrace "any controversy" existing between them at that time. This
section of the statute indicates a comprehensive coverage of contro-
versies which may be arbitrated under the statute. There is no express
restriction anywhere in the statute curtailing this generality as to what
controversies may be arbitrated thereunder. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has advanced an ominous restriction upon this generality of the
statute. It did so in Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union while con-
16. In Pennsylvania, traditional common law revocability of provisions to arbi-
trate future disputes may be readily overcome by "naming" the arbitrators therein.
Gowen v. Pierson, 166 Pa. 258, 31 Atl. 83 (1895). See STURGES, op. cit. mtpra
note 7, at 48.
On the other hand, agreements to submit present disputes apparently are
revocable according to traditional common law doctrine. See Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts
39 (Pa. 1835) and STURGES op. Cit. supra note 7, at 241.
Specific performance will apparently not be accorded either class of agree-
ments at common law. See STURGES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 83 and 262.
Apparently also common law awards may be enforced only by bringing action
thereon, and they may be vacated or modified or corrected only by equitable pro-
ceeding. See Richardson v. Cassily, 3 Watts 320 (Pa. 1834) and STURGES, Op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 674.
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sidering the first section (§ 161) of the statute and by declaring in that
connection that the statute "is not broad enough in its scope, and ap-
parently was not designed, to cover arbitration proceedings where the
remedy sought and awarded is a mandatory decree." 16a (Italics sup-
plied.) Apparently the Court intended that only such controversies as
might properly be litigated in an action at law (and not in an equitable
suit or proceeding) may be arbitrable under the statute. It is not clear
what would be the result as to claims looking, formally at least, only to
declaratory relief-such as an award of title, of right to possession or
of responsibility under a contract, or of the validity of a discharge from
employment.17 Nor is it made to appear at what point in the course of
proceedings it shall be determined whether or not "the remedy sought
and awarded is a mandatory decree."
Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union involved an arbitration
and award under a provision for arbitration in a written collective
bargaining agreement. The arbitrator, who was named in the agree-
ment, found, among other matters, that the employer had moved
his manufacturing operations from Philadelphia in violation of a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement. His award re-
quired, among other things, that the employer reestablish his manu-
facturing operations in Philadelphia and reemploy certain personnel
within a stated time. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court
which had granted the Union's petition to confirm the award and had
entered judgment thereon in accordance with its terms.
In support of its conclusion, as quoted above, the Supreme Court
relied upon § 174 of the statute. It called attention to the text of the
section as follows: "The act provides, . . . that 'The arbitration shall
be docketed in the prothonotary's office as if it were an action at law in
the prothonotary's office, with the moving party as plaintiff and the
other parties as defendant or defendants. The judgment so entered shall
have the same force and effect, in all respects as, and be subject to, all
the provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action at law, and
it may be enforced as such in accordance with existing law.'" "'
(Italics by the Court.)
The Court also declared that, in the light of § 174 "there does not
exist in Pennsylvania any statutory provision for the enforcement of
16a. Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 At. 43 (1938).
17. In McDevitt v. McDevitt, 365 Pa. 18, 73 A.2d 394 (1950), the Court re-
fused to vacate a statutory award apparently only declaratory in nature; it does ap-
pear that an argument based on the Goldstein case was made. Cf. McLean Piece
Dye Works v. Verga, 13 N.J. Misc. 416, 178 Atl. 625 (1935).
18. 328 Pa. at 393, 196 Atl. at 47. As an alternate ground of decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding that it must treat as conclusive
the arbitrator's finding of the existence of a contract to arbitrate future disputes
between the union and the particular employer here involved.
734 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
arbitration awards other than those which could be made the subject
of judgments in actions at law." "o (Italics supplied.)
It is doubted that even the latter part of the Court's position,
namely, that there is no statutory provision for the enforcement of
awards other than those which can be made the subject of judgments
in actions at law, is well conceived under the statute. This will be con-
sidered first and by way of preface to a consideration of the foregoing
more general restriction on the type of causes which may be arbitrable
under the statute.
Of course, it is not entirely clear what was meant by "enforce-
ment" of awards. If the Court meant direct levy and execution (as
upon a money judgment) the validity of the statement should be con-
ceded. But if, as is assumed, the statement intends that the statute
does not provide for the processing of awards to judgments which do
not fit the matrix of judgments in actions at law, it seems questionable.
It is assumed that this is the intent of the statement because the Court
advanced it in support of the earlier part of its position that the statute
"is not adaptable to controversies in which the relief sought is in the
nature of a mandatory decree." It seems clear, as set forth below, that
the statute does provide for the processing of awards to judgments
which do not fit within the confines of judgments in actions at law
and that it contemplates in such cases that, while compliance may
not be obtained by traditional execution as upon a judgment at law,
it may be forced by auxiliary common law or equitable remedies.
The Court seems to have placed undue emphasis upon the role of
§ 174. It is clear that the provision therein that the arbitration shall
be docketed in the prothonotary's office "as if it were an action at law,"
does not become applicable until the initiation of a statutory motion
to confirm, modify or correct an award. Then, as the text of the sec-
tion provides, the docketing shall be "as if it were an action at law."
Certainly the statutory motion proceeding (whether to confirm,
modify or correct) is not an "action at law," nor any part of one. This
19. Ibid. The Court also has stated in another case, apparently thinking in
general line with the foregoing view, that an award of money to be paid on stated
conditions "was not one upon which a judgment at law could be entered because
of the conditions which were attached to it." Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery,
319 Pa. 332, 338, 179 Atl. 558, 560 (1935).
In Retail Cigar, Drug, etc., Union v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 67 Pa. D. & C. 512
(1949) on motion by the Union under the statute to require the defendant employer
to arbitrate the issue whether defendant wrongfully discharged an employee-union
member, the Court observed as follows: "In a hearing before an arbitrator, if she
asks to be Teinstated as an employe(sic) of defendant, even if the arbitrator so
found that she should be reinstated, we do not believe that the court should enforce
such a mandatory conjunction. It is even admitted by counsel for plaintiff, at the
bar of the Court, that the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927 is not broad
enough in its scope to cover arbitration proceedings where the remedy sought is
a mandatory decree to replace a discharged employee." Id. at 515.
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provision for docketing seems to intend no more than to designate a
known and orderly procedure for handling these statutory motions by
providing that they shall be docketed in like manner as actions at law.
If the motion to confirm is approved, the Court "shall grant" an
order confirming (§ 169), and if a motion to modify or correct is ap-
proved, the Court "shall make an order modifying or correcting"
the award (§ 171). The order of the Court in each case is its final
adjudication upon the merits of the motion. Again, the order is not
a step in any "action at law."
Section 172 covers the next step in proceedings under the statute.
It prescribes that, upon granting any one of the foregoing orders, "judg-
ment [not designating that it shall be as in an "action at law"] shall
be entered in conformity therewith" by the Court in which the order
was granted. It thus appears that a conforming judgment must be
entered whether the award could be made the subject of a judgment
in an action at law or not. Such conforming judgment appears to be
required, and its entry seems to be required, whatever may have been
the relief sought and awarded and even if it is in the nature of a "man-
datory decree." Such an entry is not impossible; the judgment entered
in the lower court in the Goldstein case appears to have conformed
to the terms of the order.
It also appears from § 174 that the entry of the judgment is largely,
if not wholly, ministerial; the order "is filed with the prothonotary for
entry of the judgment thereon"; the judicial functions of the Court
are completed with the order.20 As the order of the Court is the conclu-
sion of the final adjudication upon the merits of the motion, so is it the
end of judicial review of the arbitration and award. Appeal may be
taken as provided in § 175-either from the order or from "a judgment
entered" thereon.
Up to this point we have been in no "action at law" and, if the
statutory mandate has been followed, "a judgment" has been entered
upon the order confirming, modifying or correcting, "in conformity
therewith."
Next comes the last sentence of § 174. "The judgment so entered
shall have the same force and effect, in all respects as, and be subject to,
all the provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action at law, and
it may be enforced as such in accordance with existing law." (Italics
supplied.)
In the light of the foregoing review of the steps contemplated by
the statute for processing an award to "a judgment," this sentence of
20. See, e.g., Temple v. Riverland Co., 228 S.W. 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921);
Evans v. DeSpain, 37 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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the section may be regarded as largely a postscript. In view of the pro-
cedure for bringing the award to a judgment conforming to the terms of
the order, it should have taken clear and positive provisions in § 174, or
elsewhere, to recast the proceedings and judgment entirely and exclu-
sively into the matrix of an "action at law." It is apparent, however,
that the tenor of § 174 is almost wholly enabling; the statutory nature of
the proceedings leading to and including the entry of judgment puts that
section in the role of simulating the judgment to a "judgment in an
action at law"; and the effect of the section in limiting or restricting the
judgment entered in conformity with the order upon the award must be
found chiefly in the words, "and be subject to.". The Supreme Court,
however, seems to have considered them strong and direct enough to
overcome the statutory mandate as to the judgment-that it be one en-
tered in conformity with the order of the Court upon the award-and to
force the judgment into the pattern of a judgment in an "action at law,"
thereby restricting the scope of awards that may be enforced under the
statute to those which might fit under such a judgment.
It seems quite clear that the judgment entered under the mandate
of the statute may well be recognized as a statutory judgment and that
§ 174 was not intended to limit the broad range of statutory judgments
to the confines of those judgments which could be entered in "an action
at law." It is believed that it would have been more consistent with
the statute as a whole and with the foregoing proceedings thereunder
if the Court had vested the words "and be subject to" with less abso-
lute effect. This could have been done by giving them the role of mak-
ing the judgment "subject to the provisions of law relating to a
judgment at law," except in so far as those provisions may, in a given
case, be inconsistent with the scope and effect of prior proceedings under
the statute, including the terms and provisions of the judgment entered
pursuant to the statute. This would justify the inference that if the
judgment did not fit the matrix of a judgment in an "action at law"
and hence would not support direct execution, other common law and
equitable remedies could be invoked to force compliance."' The availa-
21. Note that the normal means of enforcing judgments at law-by writs of
execution-are also available to enforce equitable decrees. Under Equity Rule No. 86,
such a writ "in the form used in the same court in suits at law" may be employed
rather than the more traditional methods of gaining compliance with decrees in
equity. The existence of this rule shows further the difficulty in basing any
dichotomy between law and equity upon the method of enforcing the court's decision.
It is true, however, as the Court noted, that arbitration statutes in other states
provide that a judgment or decree shall be entered upon the award, or that a judg-
ment entered upon an award shall have the effect of a judgment "in an action at law
or a suit in equity." In other jurisdictions the term judgiwnt as used in the arbi-
tration statute will, under local law, include both judgment (at law) and decree
(in equity). It is also true that the Pennsylvania statute says only "judgment in
an action at law." Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded from this variation of statu-
ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLV7ANIA
bility of these remedies is necessary to give full faith to the given award
and its statutory judgment; their use would place § 174 in proper
relation to the remainder of the statute.
The most important consequence, however, of the Supreme Court's
view concerning the status of the judgment and the restrictions upon its
enforcement is its view "that the act is not adaptable to controversies
in which the relief sought is in the nature of a mandatory decree." 22
Thus, the same section (§ 174) not only excludes, according to the
Court, the use of common law and equitable remedies normally available
for enforcement of judgments out-of-cast from judgments at law, but
also renders all claims looking to relief of an equitable nature totally
unarbitrable under the statute. This drastic abridgement obviously en-
tails destructive amendment of the generality of the first section of the
statute (§ 161) ; its broad coverage of "a controversy" arising in the
future out of a given contract and of "any controversy existing" between
the parties is retroactively recast to exclude all controversies not sound-
ing in the historical category of "action at law." 23 Parties with
equitable claims (and, presumably, claims for declaratory relief) lose
the substantial benefits conferred by the statute-including the provi-
sions making arbitration agreements both non-revocable and specifi-
cally enforcable and those according court appointment of arbitrators
and expeditious enforcement or vacation of the award in motion pro-
ceedings. No reasons of policy were advanced by the Court for dis-
crimination between legal and equitable claims; neither historically
nor functionally is the one less arbitrable than the other.
As heretofore observed, procedures under the statute for judicial
confirmation of an award and the Provision for entry of judgment in
conformity with the order entered upon the award are as fully adapted
tory text that the legislature of Pennsylvania intended to excise from the statute all
or any claims looking to "equitable relief." It is felt that the matter lies in a pro-
cedural zone in which the Court was peculiarly competent to interpret away any
want of precision in statutory draftmanship in order to preserve the dominant remedial
intent of the arbitration statute. See Charles Evans Hughes, THE SUPREME CoURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, at 229-230 (New York, 1928).
22. It must be observed that this consequence of the Court's conclusion as to the
type of judgment which may be entered under the statute does not necessarily follow
from the premise. A statutory award on an "equitable" question upon which the
statutory judgment might not be entered still might have considerable significance.
Although not entered as a judgment of court, the award should be a bar to any
action or suit on the cause determined by the award. See, e.g., McLean Piece Dye
remedies should be available to enforce the execution of an award rendered under
the statute; in several jurisdictions the statutory enforcement procedure has been
held not exclusive of common law actions. See STURGES, op. cit. Trupra note 7, § 3.
23. The Supreme Court has recently found an argument based on the generality
of § 161 persuasive in another context. Shannon v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 364 Pa.
379, 72 A.2d 564 (1950). The broadness of that section was invoked in support of
a rejection of an argument that "pure questions of law" can not be submitted to
arbitration under the statute.
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to an award of relief in the nature of a mandatory decree as to any
other award. Rather than restrict the scope and service of this remedial
legislation as the Court seems to have been prone to do, it should have
honored the first section of the statute as to what controversies may be
brought under the statute for arbitration and the adaptability of the
foregoing procedures to confirm awards; it could have done so with
only modest restraint upon the force which it seems to have accorded
to a very small part of the text of § 174. By doing so it would have
been more consistent with the legal principle it had previously accepted
that "it is our duty to sustain the act, if this can reasonably be done,
and not to destroy it in whole or in part." 24
CONCERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SECTION 171 (d)
Section 171 (d) of the arbitration statute reads as follows:
"Modifying or correcting award, grounds. In either of the fol-
lowing cases the Court shall make an order modifying or correcting the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: . . .
"(d) Where the award is against the law, and is such that had it
been a verdict of the jury the Court would have entered different or
other judgment notwithstanding the verdict."
Under this section arbitrations and awards under the statute are
subject to judicial review to ascertain whether or not the award is
"against the law." In Navarro Corp. v. Pittsburgh School District,25
the Supreme Court said, "The Act of 1927 [the arbitration statute]
under which this proceeding was instituted, places an award on the
same footing as the verdict of a jury, and, therefore, mistakes of law
may be rectified on appeal . ." s
It also should be noted that the Navarro case held that the party
challenging the award may raise the issue that the award is "against
the law" by opposing a petition under § 169 by the successful party to
have the award confirmed and judgment entered. If, upon review by
the Court, the matter is determined in favor of the defending party, the
petition to confirm will be denied. The defending party in the Navarro
case put the matter in issue in the lower court and defeated enforcement
of the award by a petition to enter judgment "in the nature of a judg-
24. Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd., v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, 449, 170
Ati. 286, 289 (1934).
25. 344 Pa. 429, 25 A.2d 808 (1942). To like effect: Philadelphia Hous. Auth.
v. Turner Const. Co., slpra note 6. The Court has recently remarked: "Mistakes
of law, but only mistakes of law may be rectified on appeal" . . under § 171(d).
McDevitt v. McDevitt, supra note 17 at 21, 73 A.2d at 396.
25a. 344 Pa. at 432, 25 A.2d at 810.
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ment n.o.v." Similarly, the losing party may raise the issue in a motion
to vacate an award under § 170.26 Apparently also, a formal motion to
modify or correct may be used to the same end. In short, while § 171
purports by its title to cover only motions to modify or correct awards,
under subsection (d) an award may be denied enforcement or it may be
vacated as if the proceedings were under § 170 dealing with motions
and causes to vacate awards. 8 Accordingly, more than reformation or
correction as contemplated in the rest of the section is involved in sub-
section (d).
Some caution, however, should be observed in accepting the hold-
ing of the Navarro case as the Supreme Court's final conclusion on the
nature of review. In a 1950 decision, Shannon v. Pennsylvania Electric
Co., 29 the Court held that "pure issues of law" can be submitted to
arbitration under a contract clause stipulating for statutory arbitration
of disputes. In doing so the Court disapproved a lower court dictum
that since a statutory award is only the equivalent of a jury verdict,
questions of law are not arbitrable under the statute.3 The lower
court's view seemed to be a formalistically logical extension of the
Navarro doctrine. 1
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized in stating the
statutory rule, 2 the rendering of an award reviewable as to whether
26. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co., supra note 6. The holding
was not altered by the fact that the agreement to submit disputes specified that the
decision of the arbitrator would be "conclusive."
27. See Acchione v. Commonwealth, 347 Pa. 562, 32 A.2d 764 (1943), in which,
by such motion, the party who gained a money award on only one of several items
of his claim, sought to have it "modified" to include allowances on all items of his
claim. After hearing in the lower court the award was "modified" by cutting down
the amount allowed on the one item.
28. Compare the approach manifested in Westinghouse Air Brake Company
Appeal, 166 Pa. Super. 91, 70 A.2d 681 (1950), in which the Court remarked in an-
other connection, "We may vacate an award only for the reasons stated in the Act
of April 25, 1927, § 10 [170J . . ." Id. at 97, 70 A.2d at 684.
29. 364 Pa. 379, 72 A.2d 564 (1950).
30. Commonwealth Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 163 Pa. Super.
163, 60 A.2d 411 (1948).
31. Although its holding is distinguishable from Navarro v. Pittsburgh School
Dist., supra note 25, the reasoning in Shanomw v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., suggests
a restriction of the rule of the Navarro case. See, for example, the material quoted in
footnote 3 of the Shanon opinion and infra, note 35. Cf. McDevitt v. McDevitt,
supra note 17.
The Court also is reported in the Shannon case to have said, "If arbitrators
should be limited to questions of fact, they could not pass upon the admissibility
of evidence for such questions are questions of law." Id. at 386, 72 A.2d at 567.
Quite clearly the nature or scope of the function of arbitrators in ruling upon ques-
tions of "admissibility of evidence" which may arise during an arbitral hearing does
not have any bearing upon what controversies may be covered by an arbitration
agreement between the parties or be submitted by them under the terms of the
statute or at common law.
32. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co., supra note 6, and McDevitt
v. McDevitt, siepra note 17.
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or not it is "against the law," is alien to the common law rules of finality
and conclusiveness, whereby "the arbitrators are the final judges of
law and fact." In at least two earlier cases the Court seems to have
thought that these common law rules governed statutory awards. It
must be admitted, however, that in one of these cases the question was
not in issue 3 though it was very nearly so in the other. 4  The statu-
tory rule of the Navarro case is, of course, open to the criticism offered
in these two cases in support of the opposing common law rule: "An
arbitrator, in the absence of any agreement limiting his authority, is
the final judge of both law and fact, and his award will not be reviewed
or set aside for mistake in either; otherwise arbitration proceedings, in-
stead of facilitating the settlement of disputes, would serve but to delay
the final determination of the rights of the parties." 85 (Italics
supplied).
This critique is particularly apposite since it appears that under
§ 171 (d) and the Navarro case it may well be that a trial de novo will
be required of the facts as well as on the law. In other words, the
Court may be required to make its judgment "on the law" from the
facts as established before it rather than upon the cause as presented to
the arbitrators. At all events, the Court must have before it such a
record of the evidence as will enable it to 'ascertain whether or not the
award is "against the law" and whether or not the case made before the
arbitrators fell short of sustaining the determinations of the award as
a matter of law-i.e., was the proof so inadequate that a trial judge
in similar circumstances would have had to direct a verdict or enter
a judgment n.o.v.? 8 The statute does not require a stenographic
33. Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, supra note 7.
34. Pierce Steel Pile Corp. v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 179 Atl. 558 (1935),
where, in a statutory proceeding the Court remarked, "Even if the arbitrators did
not measure the terms of the contract properly, that is not a sufficient ground to
set aside their award .... ." Id. at 338, 179 Atl. at 561. The fatal weakness of
the awards in both Navarro v. Pittsburgh School Dist. and Philadelphia Hous. Auth.
v. Turner Const. Co., was that the arbitrators had misconstrued the contracts in-
volved.
35. Like text is quoted by the Court in the 1950 case of Shannon v. Pennsylvania
Electric Co., suepra note 29. See also Patriotic Order Hall Assn. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 107, 157 Atl. 259 (1931) (appraisal); Martin-Parry Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 22 Pa. D. & C. 608 (1935) (contract of sale) ; Bowles v.
Biberman Bros., 61 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds 152 F. 2d
700 (3d Cir. 1945). A recent statement of the common law rule appears in Kingston
Coal Co. v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 312 Pa. 546, 168 Atl. 677 (1933).
In the Shannon case, in considering the arbitrability of questions of law, the
Court pointed out that the arbitration statute "would become of doubtful workability
if we should hold that it is inapplicable to questions of law in any dispute for it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether certain disputes are questions of law or
fact." Id. at 385, 72 A.2d at 567. The question of workability is, of course, equally
involved if an arbitral award is not given some status of conclusiveness against ju-
dicial review.
36. In the Navarro case the award was reviewed under a petition to enter judg-
ment "in the nature of a judgment n.o.v."
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record of the arbitral proceedings unless specifically requested by one
of the parties (§ 166), and such requests are rare. A trial in court
will, of course, be necessary in order to make a record if no transcript
is available.
If trial de novo of the facts to determine whether or not the
award is "against the law'" is to be required, reconstruction of the case
in Court presumably would be governed by rules of evidence and civil
procedure plus those special rules pertaining to proof of causes heard
by arbitrators. Thus, it seems that the burden of proof would be
allocated as in other civil proceedings, that rules as to competency,
relevance, and materiality of evidence would be applicable, and that the
special rules limiting the competency of arbitrators to testify concern-
ing their conduct at the arbitral hearing and in rendering the award
would govern. In consonance with this requirement of trial de novo
of the facts is the Supreme Court's remark in Philadelphia Hous.
Auth. v. Turner Const. Company.37 On appeal from an order setting
aside an award on the grounds that it was "against the law," the
appellant advanced the view that the lower court did not have authority
to enter final judgment against it "because the Court did not have
before it all the evidence which the arbitrators heard." The Supreme
Court responded: "We are of the opinion that there is full authority
to do so under the act."
This apprehension as to the necessity of trial de novo of the facts
also is prompted notwithstanding the statement of the Supreme
Court in Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. Smith 8 that "on a motion
to vacate the award of arbitrators, every inference of fact must be
drawn in favor of the party having the award." 8a (Italics supplied.)
While this is generally valid doctrine with respect to common law
awards, it is of dubious application to arbitrations and awards when
subjected to review under the foregoing subsection of the statute. In-
ferences of fact favorable to the party having the award might be re-
quired to be postponed at least until after the facts had been duly proved
on the review. The foregoing statement was voiced in connection with
a record wherein the arbitrators' findings "were found by the court
below to be supported by substantial evidence." It is not apparent that
the inferences required to be indulged by the Supreme Court determined
or had any substantial effect upon the scope of the hearing or functions
of the lower court in the trial on the motion to vacate.
37. See note 6 supra.
38. 350 Pa. 355, 39 A.2d 139 (1944).
38a. Id. at 359, 39 A.2d at 141.
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The conclusion that trial de novo of the facts may be required also
may be anticipated notwithstanding remarks by the Supreme Court in
Bancroft Inc. v. Millcreek Twp. 9 and other cases suggesting the
analogy of a statutory award to a verdict. In this case the arbitration
agreement expressly reserved "all matters of law arising thereupon for
the decision of the Court" in accordance with the Arbitration Act of
1836, but "otherwise said decision . . . [shall] be final . . . and shall
have the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury." In the course of
its opinion the Supreme Court remarked as follows: "The decision of
the arbitrators by agreement, here, has the force and effect of a verdict
of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence to sup-
port it" 39a (Italics supplied). The very question now under considera-
tion, namely, whether or not there is to be a trial de novo of the facts
when judicial review is duly invoked under § 171 (d) was not before
the Court. On the other hand, the stipulation of the parties that the
award should be final and have "the same force and effect as a verdict
of a jury" suggests the text of § 171 (d), which makes an award subject
to "modification" or "correction" if it is "against the law, and is such
that had it been a verdict of the jury the Court would have entered dif-
ferent or other judgment notwithstanding the verdict." (Italics sup-
plied.)4 And as reported above in the Navarro case, the Court de-
clared that the statute "places an award on the same footing as the
verdict of a jury."
Analogy of Award to Verdict. This provision of § 171 (d) of the
statute, as well as the foregoing arbitration provision in Bancroft Inc. v.
Millcreek Twp. and the view expressed in the Navarro case, prompt
reference to the difficulty of analogizing an award to a verdict of a jury
and attempting to allocate rules of civil procedure relating to appeals
involving verdicts to arbitrations and awards under the statute. The
analogy is remote and in so far as the foregoing subsection is predi-
cated upon that analogy it can be given little effect.4 ' Only very limited
simulation can be truthfully undertaken. This is true because an award
will not come to rendition in compliance with the judicial process as
prescribed for the trial of causes in civil actions before a jury. The law
of evidence applicable in such actions will not be applicable in the
arbitration unless the parties so stipulate, provided only that the arbi-
39. Id. at 534, 6 A.2d 918.
39a. 335 Pa. 529, 534, 6 A.2d 916, 918 (1939).
40. See also Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. Smith, supra note 38.
41. At common law it has been traditional to analogize awards to judgments
rather than verdicts-an award "is another name for a judgment." Brazill v. Isham,
12 N.Y. 9 (1854) ; STURGES, op. cit. s pra note 7, § 235.
ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
trators may not refuse to hear evidence which is pertinent and material
to the controversy (§ 170(c)). Unless the parties require it, the
arbitral board need not purport to make or report any findings of fact
(or "verdict").42 And, as pointed out above, if, but only if, a party or
the arbitrators request it, shall testimony be taken stenographically in
the arbitral hearing (§ 166). Accordingly will the record of the arbitral
hearing and the award generally coming before the reviewing court in
proceedings under § 171 (d) be quite different both as to content and
course of proceeding from that of a verdict in a civil action (either at
law or in equity). In no place in the statute other than in this subsec-
tion does intent appear to divide and distribute the functions of statu-
tory arbitrators and reviewing court according to those allocated to a
jury and court in civil actions; and the hypothesis of such division and
distribution can be given little reality even under this subsection. These
are the considerations which point to cattion in posing an award ren-
dered in usual arbitration proceedings in the image or innuendo of a
verdict of a jury.
The fallacy of the suggested analogy of the statutory award to ver-
dict approached full light in the opinion of the Superior Court in Com-
monwealth Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co.,4" wherein it
was declared that "pure questions of law" are not arbitrable under the
statute. "Since it has been held," said the Court, "that the Arbitration
Act of 1927, under which the rule in this case was taken, places an
award on the same footing as the verdict of a jury and therefore mis-
takes of law may be rectified on appeal (Pennsylvania Turnpike Com-
mission v. Smith et al., 350 Pa. 355, 39 A.2d 139), there would ap-
pear to be no more valid reason for referring a pure question of law to
arbitrators than there would be for submitting such question to a jury.
That, of course, would be error." The necessary inference from this
view would be that "mixed questions of fact and law" could be sub-
mitted under the statute only in part-namely, as to "the facts." Rare
indeed would be the controversy which might be fully submitted under
the statute. Accordingly, this remedial legislation would be brought
42. The statute contains no requirement that the arbitrators make or publish
findings. Martin-Parry Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 35.
The Nebraska arbitration statute has been construed to require separate state-
ment of facts found and conclusions of law. The difficulties in applying such a re-
quirement are shown in the following litigation involving it: Murry v. Mills, 1 Neb.
456 (1871); Sides v. Brendlinger, 14 Neb. 491, 17 N.W. 113 (1883); Graves v.
Scoville, 17 Neb. 593, 24 N.W. 222 (1885); Westover v. Armstrong, 24 Neb. 391,
38 N.W. *843 (1888); Burkland v. Johnson, 50 Neb. 858, 70 N.W. 388 (1897);
City of O'Neill v. Clark, 57 Neb. 760, 78 N.W. 256 (1899); In re Johnson, 87
Neb. 375, 127 N.W. 133 (1910). For review of these cases see STURGES, op. cit.
supra note 7, § 264.
43. Supra note 30.
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near to naught. And preliminary litigation would often- be necessary
to determine arbitrability. This would result notwithstanding that pro-
visions in written contracts to arbitrate "a controversy thereafter aris-
ing out of such contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof" and an agreement to submit "'any controversy" exist-
ing between the parties at the time of such agreement to submit are
expressly subject to the statute as provided in its first section (§ 161).
Suffice it to note again that the Supreme Court has repudiated the view
of the lower court."
But granting that "pure questions of law" may be submitted under
the statute, it seems clear that under such submissions the analogy of
award to verdict in § 171 (d) becomes functus officio in toto. And if
"mixed questions of fact and law" are involved, it seems to follow that
in such cases the analogy is likewise displaced-at least as to more or
less of the cause.
No decisions have been discovered which disclose the requirements
of pleading or proof which a party must meet to invoke judicial review
under the above subsection. Perhaps in connection with these particu-
lars some favorable intendment will be accorded statutory arbitrations
and awards. Otherwise arbitrations and awards under the statute gen-
erally are likely to take on the role of mere transient engagements in an-
ticipation of the statutory proceeding to retry the cause in court.
45
Whether or Not Judicial Review Under the Above Subsection
May Be Waived. No decision has been discovered which precisely de-
termines whether or not parties may effectively stipulate to waive re-
course to the above subsection. If they do so stipulate will they thereby
displace the application of the statute in toto, or will the stipulation be
disregarded? Opinions of the Supreme Court have indicated that the
stipulation might be disregarded. In connection with the construction
of § 176 of the statute, the Court, in giving it the mandatory
effect which it has, has reiterated that when the statute is once engaged
by execution of an arbitration agreement in writing, that section makes
the statute applicable in its entirety; "neither of the parties could waive
any part of the statute, but both are bound by the act in its entirety."
These views were voiced, however, in cases in which the Commonwealth
(or an agency or subdivision thereof) was a party to the arbitration
agreement.46  Decisions under the Act of 1836 (Purdon Pa. Stat.
44. Shannon v. Penn Edison Co., supra note 29. See Stofflet & Tillotson v.
Chester Hous. Auth. 32 Del. Co. 317 (Pa. 1943).
45. The futility of this role has been referred to in such cases as Goldstein v.
Garment Workers' Union, supra note 7. See, also, cases cited in note 35 mpra.
46. See cases as reviewed infra p. 745, et seq.
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tit. 5, Ch. 1 § 4) indicate that such stipulation might be honored with-
out displacing the application of the statute.47
General. The irony of § 171 (d) lies in its caution to parties
against too ready resort to the use of arbitration agreements and arbi-
trations under the statute notwithstanding its probable over-all purpose
to facilitate their use. Thus, as one result of this subsection and the
foregoing decisions and opinions of the courts, parties must reconsider
the expediency of following the long-standing practice of designating
architects or engineers in construction and installation contracts as
arbitrators unless they are learned in the law. This caution, indeed,
is equally pertinent to any designation of laymen in arbitration agree-
ments under the statute. It also seems clear that a court, in proceed-
ings under § 164 of the statute to gain court appointment of arbitrators,
must bear these matters in mind in considering and determining the
qualifications of a person for appointment as arbitrator.
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRACTS WITH THE COMMON-
WEALTH, ITS AGENCIES OR SUBDIVISIONS
Section 176 of the arbitration statute reads as follows:
"State and municipal contracts. The provisions of this act
shall apply to any written contract to which the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, or any agency or subdivision thereof, or any
municipal corporation or political division of the Commonwealth
shall be a party."
The Supreme Court has reiterated that this section makes arbitra-
tion provisions in written contracts to which the Commonwealth, or its
agencies or subdivisions, is a party automatically subject to the statute.
In Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co.4" the Court stated the mat-
ter as follows: "With this legislative declaration in view, it is impos-
sible to conclude that the law-making body did not intend that all arbi-
trations provided for in contracts with the Commonwealth or its agen-
cies should be under the act." The Court advanced this view in connec-
tion with its determination that the arbitration provision in the contract
in question was subject to the statute and was not effective as a common
law provision and, accordingly, that § 171(d) providing for judicial
review of an arbitration and award to determine whether or not the
award was "against the law," was applicable. The Court relied upon
47. See McCahan v. Reamey, 33 Pa. 535 (1859); Bancroft, Inc. v. Twp. of
Millcreek, 21 Erie 29 (Pa. 1938); Cf. Speer v. Bidwell, 44 Pa. 23 (1863).
48. 343 Pa. 512, 23 A.2d 426 (1942).
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its earlier opinion and decision in . M. Davis Co. v. Shaler Twp.49 In
that case a contract with the township for construction of sewers con-
tained a provision for arbitration of disputes arising thereunder. The
arbitration provision was general in scope covering all disputes arising
in connection with the contract; "the Engineer" (not naming him)
was designated therein as arbitrator. He was employed by the town-
ship. It was subsequently stipulated by the parties that Ross, who was
the engineer, was disqualified to act-for reasons not disclosed in the
opinion of the Court. Held: That § 164 was properly invoked to gain
court appointment of a substitute. In this connection the Court re-
marked: "When the parties entered into the arbitration agreement now
before us they ipso facto embodied in that agreement all of the provi-
sions of the Arbitration Act," including, of course, the remedy of court
appointment of arbitrators as provided in § 164. It may be noted, in
passing, that this ipso facto embodiment of the provisions of the Arbi-
tration Act in the foregoing arbitration provision was not attributed
in any way to the above quoted section (§ 176) of the statute; that sec-
tion was not mentioned in the opinion of the Court.50
The Court also took the position in Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner
Const. Co. that § 176 impliedly repealed § 1 of the Act of 1925 (Purdon
Pa. Stat. tit. 5, § 180) authorizing the inclusion in contracts entered
into by the Commonwealth, or its agencies or subdivisions, of provi-
sions to arbitrate in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration
Act of 1836. The Court advanced this view in overruling an argument
for the appellant, the contractor, to the effect that § 176 was designed to
do no more than authorize public officials to use arbitration provisions
in such public contracts; that it did not necessarily nor automatically
render such provisions subject to the present arbitration statute.
Ruling the implied repeal the Court said: "Attention is called to the
Act of May 13, 1925, P. L. 670, Sec. 1, 5 PS § 180, which sets forth,
that after the date of the act it shall be lawful to include in any contract
executed by the Commonwealth or any agency thereof a provision that
any matter in dispute arising under the contract shall be submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act of June 16, 1836, P.
L. 715, 5 PS § 1 et seq., and it is suggested that section 16 of the Act
of 1927 [§ 176] is but confirmatory of this provision. The two enact-
ments differ entirely in language and in scope and we are unable to
accept the suggestion. Section 16 [§ 176] is mandatory and applies
the provisions of the act of which it is a part to any written contract to
49. 332 Pa. 134, 2 A.2d 708 (1938).
50. See note 8 supra.
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which the Commonwealth or any agency thereof is a party. This
section impliedly repeals the Act of 1925." "'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the automatic application of the
arbitration statute to arbitration provisions in written contracts with
the Commonwealth in Seaboard Surety Co. v. Commonwealth."2 The
arbitration provision in this case was contained in a contract for the
construction of a highway and bridge for the Commonwealth. It pro-
vided for the arbitration of all' disputes arising in connection with the
contract; that they were to be "referred to the Secretary of Highways
and the Attorney General;" and that their decision and award "shall be
final, binding, and conclusive upon all parties without exception or ap-
peal; and all rights of any action at law or in equity under and by virtue
of this contract and all matters connected with it and relative thereto
are hereby expressly waived . . ." Dispute arose; an arbitration was
had and an award was rendered in favor of the Commonwealth. The
contractor moved to vacate relying upon several grounds specified in
§ 170, including the following: that the arbitrators refused to hear testi-
mony; that they did not act in due quorum; that they caused ex parte
investigations of the matters in issue to be made by a third person; and
the plaintiff was not accorded opportunity to examine or be heard on
the matters reported. The Commonwealth filed a counterpetition chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the motion to
vacate relying upon the stipulations in the arbitration provision that
an award thereunder should be final and binding without exception or
appeal and the waiver of all remedies at law and equity with respect to
the contract. The Supreme Court set forth the question at issue and its
ruling as follows: "The sole question for our determination is whether
the Act of 1927 [the arbitration statute], which is not mentioned in the
51. In the earlier case of W. Bancroft, Inc. v. Millcreek Twp., 335 Pa. 529,
6 A.2d 916 (1939), apparently in a written submission after dispute had arisen be-
tween the contractor and the township, the parties expressly reserved "right of appeal
on questions of law, in accordance with the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 715, 5 PS
§ 1." The Supreme Court apparently considered the stipulation effective and obliga-
tory; it said at 532: "The authority in the township supervisors to submit to arbi-
tration under the Act of 1836 can be found in the Act of May 13, 1925, P.L. 670,
sec. 2, 5 PS 181." In Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Turiter Con-st. Co., supra note 6, the
Court commented at 520, on the Bancroft case as follows: "What was said about the
arbitration agreement in accordance with the arbitration Act of 1836 was but incidental
and was not intended to mean that we thereby sanctioned an arbitration of a dispute
as to the liability of the township to the contractor for extra work under the Act
of 1836."
The truth seems to be that the proceedings in the Bancroft case--on the assump-
tion that the Act of May 13, 1925, P.L. 670, 5 Purdon § 180 was effective-were so
similar to those under the present statute as involved in Philadelphia Hous. Auth.
v. Turter Con-st. Co. that the declared repeal of this Act was more formal than sub-
stantial. See, however, the cases cited note 47 supra, concerning the possibility of
waiver of review of an award under the Act of 1836 for being against the law.
52. 345 Pa. 147, 27 A.2d 27 (1942).
748 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
written contract here involved, governs the arbitration therein provided
for. This question must be answered in the affirmative . . ." The
Court relied upon the "shall" in § 176 and reiterated its views as voiced
in Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co., that the section "is manda-
tory and applied the provisions of the act of which it is a part to any
written contract to which the Commonwealth or any agency thereof is
a party." "Thus," the Court concluded, "it is clear that the Act of 1927
governs the award under consideration, even though the arbitration
clause of the contract provides that the award shall be final and con-
clusive and there shall be no right of appeal. Since section 16 [§ 176]
is mandatory, neither of the parties could waive any part of the statute,
but both are bound by the act in its entirety." Accordingly, it was held
that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the foregoing statutory mo-
tion to vacate the award.
This ruling also prevailed over the further objection of the Com-
monwealth that it could not be sued without express statutory authority.
The Court remarked as to this objection that, since the above section of
the statute is mandatory, "the Legislature granted express authority to
institute such proceedings as are here under consideration against the
Commonwealth where it is a party to a contract containing an arbitra-
tion clause." 53
May Parties Stipulate Themselves Out of the Statute? In con-
sidering the foregoing views the following question naturally occurs:
May parties (whether or not one of them is the Commonwealth or an
agency or subdivision thereof) stipulate in an arbitration provision in a
written contract that the statute shall not apply and have the stipulation
respected? Obviously, parties may wish to do so, for example, to avoid
judicial review of an arbitration and award under § 171 (d) of the
statute on the ground that the award is "against the law," unless they
can effectively stipulate to waive recourse to that subsection and keep
within the statute.54
It seems that such stipulation should be accorded full faith and
credit by the Court. None of the foregoing cases indicates a contrary
conclusion when the Commonwealth is not a party. It is even doubted
that the holdings of any of those cases foreclose such ruling when the
Commonwealth is a party. In none of them did the parties expressly
53. The view that § 176 makes the arbitration act automatically applicable to any
written contract with the Commonwealth notwithstanding stipulations that the award
shall be final and binding and that there shall be no right to appeal was expressly
reaffirmed and applied in Acchione v. Commonwealth, supra note 27. The precise
issue in the case was the same as in Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const.
Co.
54. See discussion supra as to whether or not a stipulation to waive recourse to
§ 171 (d) will be honored.
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stipulate away the whole statute. The statute as a whole is an enabling
one in the field of remedies. Section 176 of the statute is made most
consistent with this principle when it is read as authorizing the Com-
monwealth to use the statute and without placing such emphasis on the
"shall" therein as would strip the Commonwealth of its power and privi-
lege to choose its contracts in this connection. It seems very doubtful
that the "shall" was intended so to single out the Commonwealth from
all other parties and restrict its power in the use of arbitration provi-
sions. It also seems entirely clear that the Commonwealth (or its agen-
cies or subdivisions) stands in no special need of protection while deter-
mining the scope and status of the arbitration provisions to be included
in its contracts. Its competence and facilities for contracting are ade-
quate enough to warrant trusting its choice whether to stipulate for
common law arbitration or arbitration under the statute-as, indeed,
whether to stipulate for any arbitration in its contracts.55
As heretofore noted, the Supreme Court has adopted the generally
prevailing view that the arbitration statute does not displace the privi-
lege of parties to arbitrate at common law-and that they may do so
under written agreements of arbitration. While the agreement for
arbitration may be adequately formalized (by writing) to qualify under
and engage the statute, if parties further expressly and precisely stipu-
late therein that the statute shall not apply, it seems that the Court
may deem itself free to honor their contract whether or not the Com-
monwealth is one of the parties and notwithstanding its foregoing views.
The general solicitude of the Supreme Court that contracts, including
arbitration agreements, be respected and carried out according to their
terms is illustrated in Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas
Corp.56 In that case the Court ordered a party to an arbitration provi-
sion in a written contract to proceed with an out-of-state arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the arbitration provision which required
that the arbitration be held in New York and according to the rules
of arbitration of the Silk Association of America, Inc. It expressed
its "entire accord" with the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals in Gilbert v. Burnstine,57 wherein the Court observed,
among other things, that "Contracts made by mature men, who are not
wards of the Court should, in the absence of potent objections, be en-
forced." And the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania continued: "That
55. The Commonwealth may be especially concerned to stipulate for arbitration
at common law if § 171 (d) of the statute is going to have the effect of disqualifying
non-lawyer public officials from serving as arbitrators under its construction, installa-
tion and similar contracts.
56. 313 Pa. 442, 170 Atl. 286 (1934). This case is reviewed further infra.
57. 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
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decision is based upon the doctrine of inviolability of contracts which
has been a cardinal principle in the constitutional law of both the nation
and the state ever since they have existed as such. As the years go by,
and we are brought face to face with many ingenious attempts to evade
or qualify it, we are increasingly convinced of the necessity for holding
fast to this ancient landmark of our constitutional existence." rs
It also seems probable that parties to a written arbitration agree-
ment, whether under the statute or stipulated out of it, may include
provisions governing the arbitral proceedings and award, or incorporate
by reference arbitration rules of an organization like the American
Arbitration Association or of a trade association, provided that, if the
arbitration agreement is under the statute, the arbitration may not be
inconsistent with the statute or rules of court duly promulgated there-
under. 9
ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER CLAUSES-WHETHER "PROVISIONS
FOR ARBITRATION"
In Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co. ° the Supreme Court
voiced the quite radical innovation that: "Provisions in contracts which
give engineers or architects or heads of municipal or state departments
power to decide questions are not arbitration provisions in the sense
that the Arbitration Act provides." (Italics supplied.) 61 As to why
this was so-and indirectly indicating what the Court thought was the
idea back of the term "arbitration provisions" in the sense that "the
Arbitration Act provides"-the Court continued as follows: "Boards
of arbitration under that act are judicial bodies. Individuals given the
right to decide in their own favor or in favor of the person who employs
them cannot be said to be exercising a judicial function at all. They
exercise a power given them by the contract to decide, not to judicially
hear and determine." (Italics supplied.) The Court entered upon
these generalizations in rejecting an argument that the arbitration pro-
vision in the case was at common law and, therefore, not subject to
§ 171 (d) of the arbitration statute providing for judicial review of an
arbitration and award to determine whether or not the award is
58. See also Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Atl. 869 (1913), which held un-
constitutional as a violation of the right to contract a statute which said that contracts
for the submission of disputes to engineers and architects should not deprive the
courts of jurisdiction.
59. See Katakura & Co. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., supra note 6. This case
is reported further infra.
60. 343 Pa. 512, 23 A.2d 426 (1942).
61. That this was a radical innovation upon the common law of Pennsylvania
see STUPaEs, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 11, 20; and Adinolfi v. Hazlett, mtpra note 42.
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"against the law." It also appears that counsel cited the ruling of the
Court in Canuso v. Philadelphia 12 in support of their argument that
the arbitration provision in Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co.
should be considered as at common law and that, therefore, the award
thereunder should not be subject to judicial review under § 171(d).
The Court replied that in Canuso v. Philadelphia "there was no arbitra-
tion"; hence no provision for arbitration, and no award. This state-
ment seems open to criticism for judical haste in citation of prior
decisions. Reference to Canuso v. Philadelphia will disclose that not
only the parties and the trial court, but also the Supreme Court fully
understood and accepted that the issues therein presented involved an
arbitration provision and an arbitration and award thereunder. In that
case a provision in a construction contract between a contractor and the
City of Philadelphia designated the Director of Public Works of the
City to decide "on any questions arising in connection with the per-
formance of [the] contract." Controversy arose as to which of the two
parties was responsible for the buckling of certain temporary work when
the permanent construction was superimposed and for the cost of ade-
quately repairing the temporary work to carry the permanent construc-
tion. The question of responsibility was referred to the director; 03
after hearing the respective parties and making certain investigations in
which the parties acquiesced, he returned his award that the City bore
the liability. Said the Supreme Court: "We are not impressed with
defendant's contention that there was no valid award binding upon
the municipality. The jurisdiction of the arbitrator extended to 'any
question arising in connection with the performance of [the] contract.'
His authority was broad; it clearly included the power to settle the
controversy in the instant case. . . . The designation of the Director
of Public Works, under whose supervision the construction was to be
effected, as the arbitrator of any dispute that might arise between the
parties, was only logical. The practice of making a municipal officer
arbitrator of controversies arising between the municipality and a
private contractor is well established"-citing earlier Pennsylvania
cases. 4 (Italics supplied.)
It may be conceded that no consideration was given in Canuso v.
Philadelphia as to whether or not the arbitration statute was applicable.
62. 326 Pa. 302, 192 At!. 133 (1937).
63. The question of damages for the extra work entailed by the collapse was
not submitted to the Director along with the question of liability because the parties
had previously reached an agreement on this issue. Only liability was controverted.
64. The Court cited Commonwealth ex rel. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh,
206 Pa. 379, 55 At]. 1058 (1903); Werneberg v. Pittsburg, 210 Pa. 267, 59 At.
1000 (1904) ; Clark & Sons Co. v. Pittsburg, 217 Pa. 46, 66 Atl. 154 (1907) ; Curran
v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 111, 107 At. 636 (1919).
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It is inferred that none of the parties, nor the lower court, nor the
Supreme Court, gave thought to the statute or its applicability. The
award was. sustained and held to be enforceable; the plaintiff recovered
thereon according to its terms.
If the award, as rendered under the foregoing arbitration provi-
sion in Canuso v. Philadelphia was valid outside the statute as at com-
mon law, the question occurs: What was there in the statute to dis-
qualify the arbitration and award and the provision under which the
proceedings were had in Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co. from
being valid under the statute? Nothing explicit in the statute requires
that "boards of arbitration under the act" shall be "judicial bodies" as
suggested in the latter case, and nothing explicit in the statute sustains
the further statement of the Court in that case that: "Provisions in
contracts which give engineers or architects or heads of municipal or
state departments power to decide questions are not arbitration provi-
sions in the sense that the Arbitration Act provides." Accordingly,
the foregoing thesis of the Court seems to have had no apparent sup-
port either at common law or under the statute-and the Court cited
none.
The status of architect and engineer clauses in construction con-
tracts received further attention from the Supreme Court in the sub-
sequent case of Seaboard Surety Co. v. Commonwealth.' Issue was
raised whether or not an award rendered in favor of the Common-
wealth under an arbitration provision in a construction contract be-
tween a contractor and the Commonwealth was subject to the con-
tractor's motion to vacate for one or more causes set forth in § 170 of
the statute. The arbitration provision designated the Secretary of
Highways and the Attorney General as the arbitrators. The Common-
wealth argued, among other matters, that under the foregoing doctrine
of Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co. the statute could not be
invoked. It contended that the statement: "Provisions in contracts
which give engineers or architects or heads of municipal or state de-
partments power to decide questions are not arbitration provisions in
the sense that the Arbitration Act provides," as uttered in Phila. Hous.
Auth. v. Turner Const. Co., indicated that the statute was not intended
to govern arbitration when provided for in a contract to which the
Commonwealth was a party and in which the Secretary of Highways
and the Attorney General were designated as arbitrators. The Supreme
Court overruled the argument as follows: "There is no merit in this
argument. The practice of making a state or municipal official arbi-
65. 345 Pa. 147, 27 A.2d 27 (1942).
ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
trator of a controversy arising between the state or municipality and
a contractor is well established (Commonwealth v. Eastern Pay. Co.,
288 Pa. 571 ; Curran v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 111 ; Werneberg v. Pitts-
burg, 210 Pa. 267; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Pittsburg, 206 Pa. 379),
and the Act of 1927 [the arbitration statute] contains no limitation as
to who may serve as arbitrators." (Italics supplied.)
The Court did, however, indicate its continued support for its fore-
going statement in Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co., by sug-
gesting that it was there made "merely to distinguish the provisions of
the contract there under consideration from those involved" in the
Canuso case. It was not made apparent why that distinction would be
any longer significant after the ruling in Seaboard Surety Co. v. Com-
monwealth.
The Court further declared that the award in Phila. Hous. Auth.
v. Turner Const. Co. "was made under an arbitration . . . contract
which provided for a decision of a dispute between the parties by quasi-
judicial means for the purpose of settling the entire subject matter in
issue; while in the Canuso case there was a mere decision, made by the
Director of Public Works of the City of Philadelphia, of a fact relating
to performance in order to expedite the progress of the work, which
decision was not intended to terminate the whole controversy between
the parties, but instead left to them the right to resort to suit or arbitra-
tion." (Italics supplied.) While it is true that the Director's award
in the Canuso case decided only the question of the City's liability,
the making of that decision involved a determination of the facts in the
case and of the parties' liability, in the light of those facts, under the
terms of their contract. Accordingly, there seems to be nothing in that
case to support the foregoing allocation of insignificance to the arbitral
proceedings and award therein; indeed, the Court sustained the award
as valid in law.
In both Phila. Hous. Auth. v. TurnerConst. Co. and Seaboard
Surety Co. v. Commonwealth the Court also advanced the view that
the parties in Canuso v. Philadelphia did not intend that the Director
of Public Works should serve as an arbitrator because the construction
contract further provided that "nothing in this clause shall be taken to
indicate that the Contractor, with the consent of the Director, cannot
appeal to arbitration in accordance with the Pennsylvania State Law
approved April 25, 1927 [the arbitration statute]." (Italics supplied.)
"From this," the court has reiterated, "it is apparent that the parties did
not regard the position of the director to be the equivalent of an arbi-
trator." This conclusion does not seem as apparent as the Court
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indicates. While the reference of "this clause" in the foregoing text
of the agreement is not reported, it seems clear that if the parties were
to proceed with an arbitration under the statute, they were to do so
only with the consent of the director and that such arbitration would be
in lieu of his own proceeding with respect to the given controversy.
That this alternative was stipulated seems scarcely to lend weight to the
view that the director was not regarded by the parties as "the equiv-
alent of an arbitrator" when he was called upon to act and he did so.
From this review of the cases it seems doubtful that the thesis
with respect to architect or engineer clauses as originally advanced in
Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Turner Const. Co. now has any vitality in the
arbitration law of Pennsylvania.
PROVISIONS FOR VALUATIONS AND PRICE FIXING-WHETHER
"PROVISIONS FOR ARBITRATION"
Plaintiff agreed to buy and defendants to sell certain land "at a
price to be fixed by appraisement to be made by the Pittsburgh Real
Estate Board." The amount to be paid was decided and reported to
the parties. Held, that a motion by the plaintiff under the statute to
vacate or modify the award would not lie since the whole affair con-
stituted no arbitration or award. And this was so because there had
been no dispute arising or existing between the parties which was
susceptible of arbitration. Said the Court: "The record shows that
when they made their agreement there was no controversy; one had
land that the other wished to buy, but he could not require the owner to
sell; the owner could not require his neighbor to buy; the parties were
under no obligation to each other; there was neither contract nor duty.
If they differed about the price to be paid, that difference was not an
existing controversy in the sense that it furnished either with rights
against the other, such, for example, as might have existed if one had
the power of condemning the land of the other and proposed to exer-
cise it. . . . They agreed to have the property appraised by a named
appraiser, and to buy and sell at that appraisement. The appraisement
was made but it is not an award of arbitrators." (Italics supplied.) "
66. Grote v. Stein, 99 Pa. Super. 556 (1930), noted 35 DIcK. L. REv. 240
(1931). The court quoted 1 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 440, to the effect that
"In order to constitute a submission to arbitration there must be some difference or
dispute, either existing or prospective, between the parties, and they must intend that
it should be determined in a quasi-judicial manner . . . . in the case of a valua-
tion there is not, as a rule, any difference or dispute between the parties. .. ."
Accord, Poland Coal Co. v. Hillman Coke & Coal Co., 357 Pa. 535, 55 A.2d 414
(1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 862 (1948) (provision in a lease of coal properties
for one named as "arbitrator" to determine amount of recoverable coal and its value
in connection with the exercise of an option to purchase. The vendor claimed only
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Appraisal Provisions in Insurance Policies. Whether or not ap-
praisal provisions in insurance policies covering loss of property or
awards thereunder qualify under the arbitration statute is undeter-
mined. Although it is not clear, the Supreme Court may have assumed
in P. 0. S. of A. Hall Assn. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.6 7 that such
awards are subject to the statute, but on the other hand, in other cases 68
it has been declared that it is questionable whether such provisions come
within the statute.
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
By the first section of the statute (§ 161), provisions for arbitra-
tion in contracts for "personal services" are excepted from the act. It
has not been decided by the Supreme Court whether or not a collective
bargaining agreement between an employer and his employees or their
union is a contract for "personal services" under the statute. While
an arbitration and an award rendered under a provision for arbitration
in a written collective bargaining agreement were involved in Goldstein
v. Garment Workers' Union,69 the Court did not consider this question
in its opinion. Collective bargaining agreements as presently used by
employers and labor unions were little known at the time the statute
was enacted. And, though they may fix terms of employment, collec-
tive bargaining agreements do not constitute contracts which obligate
or assure employment of any specific person. Accordingly, it seems
reasonable to give contracts "for personal services," as used in the
statute, a more restricted meaning.70
that the option itself was void and refused to discuss other issues. Held: there was
no controversy, within the meaning of the word as used in the Arbitration Act, to be
settled by an arbitration.)
In McDevitt v. McDevitt, supra note 2, an award fixing the value of decedent's
interest in a partnership was considered as being within the statute; there was no
discussion of the the issue now under consideration. The future disputes provision
was predicated upon disagreement of the parties as to the value; and they had in fact
disagreed.
67. 305 Pa. 107, 157 Atl. 259 (1931).
68. Isaac v. Donegal & Conoy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 351, 152 At. 95
(1930); see also, Robinson v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 110 Pa. Super. 396,
168 Atl. 321 (1933) ; Boll v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 20 Pa. D. & C. 511 (1934).
69. Supra, note 7.
70. It was so held in Kaplan v. Bagrier, 12 Pa. D. & C. 693 (1929). See Camp-
bell v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 33 Pa. Del. Co. 204
(1944). Consult, also, Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770 (1940).
But in Retail Cigar, Drug and Luncheonette Employees Union v. Sun Ray Drug
Co., 67 Pa. D. & C. 512 (1949), the Court declared, at 515, that it was not in
accord with Kaplan v. Bagrier, spra and that: "The collective bargaining agree-
ment itself is a contract for personal services between a union representing its
members and the employer of members of the union. . . . All of the provisions
of the agreement relate to the personal services of the employe members of the union
to the employer, the Sun Ray Drug Company."
An agency contract with an actor to gain engagements for the actor in return
for a share of his income has been held not to be a "contract for personal services"
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It also may be noted that controversies which are existing between
parties to a contract for "personal services" may well qualify for sub-
mission by written agreement under the statute.1 The foregoing sec-
tion purports to except from the statute only provisions to arbitrate
future disputes in contracts for personal services.
DETERMINATION OF THE "MAKING" OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
It seems clear that "the making" of an arbitration agreement may
be put in issue and made subject to trial according to § 163 not only
(1), with respect to the validity of its original consummation, but also
(2), with respect to its coverage, namely, whether a given controversy
is or is not within the intent of the agreement, and (3), with respect
to its alteration, substitution, or rescission by express or implied agree-
ment of the parties, or by its expiration under its own terms.72 Thus,
in Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, the matter was regarded as
put in issue and subject to trial as provided in § 163 when it was made
to appear that the parties may have come to an agreement upon an
express contract which displaced the arbitration provision. 3
Moreover, the matter may be put in issue after arbitration and
after the award has been rendered; as, for example, in opposition to a
petition to confirm the award. And the arbitrator's ruling at the
arbitral hearing that the defendant was a party to, and bound by, the
main contract and arbitration provision therein should generally be
disregarded at the trial. Said the Court in the Goldstein case in this
connection: "Appellants having raised the issue as to whether they were
under this exception. Layne v. Phillips, 67 Pa. D. & C. 40 (1948). The court de-
scribed the situation and expressed its ruling as follows: "The long and short of the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant is a written contract whereby defendant,
an actor's agent, undertook to secure and guarantee engagements for plaintiff, an
actor, for a consideration-a percentage of what plaintiff-actor would get from those
engagements. From that relationship, I do not see one of personal services; certainly,
when I follow the master-and-servant line drawn by other judges. See Kaplan
et al. v. Bagrier et al., 12 D. & C. 693; Couzens v. Wachtel et al., 64 D. & C. 459,
462." In the Couzens case, arbitration of disputes growing out of a partnership re-
lationship were held not to be within the "personal service" exception.
71. As, for example, in Ellwood City Motor Coach Co. v. Ellwood City Traction
Workers Union, 67 Pa. D. & C. 401 (1948).
72. Goldstein v. Garment Workers' Union, sapra note 7. See, also, Justice
Stern, concurring in J. S. Cornell & Son, Inc. v. Rosenwald, supra note 2; Stofflet &
Tillotson v. Chester Hous. Auth., stepra note 2; Dickens v. Pennsylvania Tpke.
Comm., 351 Pa. 252, 40 A.2d 421 (1945).
In the Goldstein case, the Court further quoted with approval from Finsilver,
Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas. & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 117 N.E. 579 (1930), to
the effect that court determination of jurisdictional issues is required by due process.
Concerning the construction of arbitration agreements, see cases cited notes 1
and 2 supra.
73. Supra note 7. Compare Weldon & Kelly Co. v. Pavia Co., 354 Pa. 75, 46
A.2d 466 (1946), in which the matter seems to have escaped any attention.
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parties to the contract under which the arbitration was to be conducted,
that question had to be preliminarily determined by the court (appel-
lants having waived a jury trial), and the arbitrator could not, in con-
travention of the statute, determine his own status and jurisdiction by
finding that appellants were bound by the contract under which he pur-
ported to act." "4
Furthermore, a bill for declaratory judgment will not lie to deter-
mine whether a given controversy is within the terms of an arbitration
provision which qualified under the arbitration statute. In Stofflet &
Tillotson v. Chester Hous. Auth.75 the Court noted that petition under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act "is not an optional substitute
for established and available remedies. . . . Sections 3 and 4 of the
Arbitration Act (5 PS §§ 163, 164) provide an adequate remedy for
determining just such questions as are raised here. It is even provided
by § 17 (5 PS § 177) that if difficult legal questions arise before the
arbitrators, they may have access to the court of common pleas for
a declaratory judgment on such questions of law." Noting further that
the pleadings may have raised issues of fact, the Court further observed,
"While § 9 (12 PS § 839) of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides
for submitting disputed questions of fact to a jury, § 3 (5 PS § 163)
of the Arbitration Act makes like provision. Such a situation should
be taken into consideration in determining the availability of remedies.
'Ordinarily, it [the court] will not act [under the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act] where there is a dispute as to facts, or such controversy
may arise.'"
Notwithstanding this ruling, a bill for injunction to restrain
arbitration proceedings raising the same issue as under the foregoing
bill for declaratory judgment was heard and allowed in Ellwood City
Motor Coach Co. v. Ellwood City Traction Workers' Union."0
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS BY ORDERING
OUT-OF-STATE ARBITRATIONS
The Supreme Court has taken a worthy position in determining
the enforcement of arbitration agreements by ordering out-of-state
arbitrations when the agreements so provide. In order to fulfill the
terms of an arbitration agreement a party may be ordered under § 163
to proceed with an arbitration in another state. In Nippon Ki-Ito
74. That the prevailing common law view is in accord as to judicial review of
an arbitrator's jurisdiction, see STuaGEs, op cit. mtpra note 7, § 45.
75. 346 Pa. 574, 31 A.2d 274 (1943).
76. 67 Pa. D. & C. 401 (1948).
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Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp.,77  the arbitration clause
provided that: "Every dispute, of whatever character, arising out
of this contract, must be settled by arbitration in New York, to be con-
ducted in the manner provided by the by-laws, rules and regulations of
the Silk Association of America, Inc., governing arbitrations." (Italics
supplied.)
Plaintiff was a Japanese corporation with an office in New York
City. It had contracted with the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation
having its principal office in Pennsylvania, for the sale of silk by the
plaintiff to the defendant. Defendant refused to make payments under
the contract, alleging defects in the silk delivered.
The court below denied plaintiff's petition for an order to arbitrate
in New York. This was held to be erroneous. The Supreme Court
disposed of several objections to granting the order.
(1) Defendant argued that the Pennsylvania court should not
order the New York arbitration because the New York courts would
not, in like case, order a Pennsylvania arbitration. In overruling this
point the Court said: "It is difficult to see upon what principle we could
so decide, even if the courts of New York had so held, since it is our
duty to determine all legal questions raised in accordance with the law
as we understand it, no matter what the courts of other states may
do. ,, 78
(2) The defendant also based its objection to granting an order
for the New York arbitration on the ground that the Pennsylvania
arbitration statute related only to arbitrations held in Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court indicated that the court below relied mainly upon
this point in denying plaintiff's petition. Proceedings under § 166
(relating to the arbitral hearings and the summoning of witnesses),
§ 170 (providing motion proceedings to vacate awards for causes there-
77. 313 Pa. 442, 170 Ati. 286 (1934).
78. The Court also indicated that defendant was in error in its view that the New
York courts would not order an out-of-state arbitration in a parallel case, relying
upon the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y.
348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). Upon reference to the New York decisions precisely in
point it seems that the defendant was correct that the New York courts refuse to
order a party to proceed with an arbitration outside New York State. Application
of Inter-Ocean Food Products, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N.Y.S. 536 (1st Dep't.
1923); In re California Packing Corp., 121 Misc. 212 (Sup. Ct.), 201 N. Y. Supp.
158 (1923). See also Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 210 N.Y. Supp. 10, (1925) ;
Cardozo J., concurring in Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105
N.E. 653 (1914). Concededly, however, these decisions were before that in Gilbert
v. Burnstine. It seems further, however, that the New York view as voiced in the
pre-Gilbert v. Burnstine cases is of dubious validity and that the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Nippon Ki-Ito Kaiha case is more in accord
with the provisions of the statute. New Jersey had sustained the order for the out-
of-state arbitration in 1931. In Re California Lima Bean Growers Assn. 9 N. J.
Misc. 367, 154 Atl. 532 (1931).
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in set forth) and § 171 (providing like proceedings to modify or correct
an award for causes therein stated) were cited by the lower court to fix
the locale in Pennsylvania of arbitrations under the statute.
With respect to the localizing effect of § 166 the Supreme Court
observed as follows: "The court below calls attention to the fact that
section 6 [§ 166] says that if witnesses summoned by the arbitrators
refuse . . to obey said summons, upon petition, the court of com-
mon pleas of the county in which such arbitrators are sitting may
compel them to appear and testify. [Quoting from the statute.] It
does so say, but therefrom there is no justification for the conclusion
of the court below 'that this clearly indicates that the legislature in-
tended that the act should only apply to situations where the arbitrators
were sitting in Pennsylvania.'" (Italics supplied.) The Supreme
Court added: "If the arbitrators were sitting in New York and the
witnesses were in Pennsylvania, that provision could be applied, but
it could not be applied to cases where the witnesses were not in Penn-
sylvania, no matter where the arbitrators were sitting." This state-
ment is not clear for, upon referring to the above text of § 166 (and
especially the part in italics), it is not manifest how it could be invoked
if the arbitrators were sitting in New York.
By way of conclusion on this point the Supreme Court stated that:
"What the provision under consideration does mean is, that in the case
of recalcitrant witnesses, the court of common pleas of the county where
the arbitrators are sitting cannot escape acting because the suit is pend-
ing in some other county." (Italics supplied.) This statement also is
not clear and seems as dubious as the preceding one.
However, the fallacy of the view of the lower court on the point
under consideration seems quite manifest for other reasons. It is clear
that the remedy to gain an order to proceed "in accordance with the
terms" of the arbitration agreement as provided in § 163 of the statute
was not expressly restricted to arbitration agreements providing for
arbitration in Pennsylvania only. And if, "in accordance with the
terms" of an arbitration agreement, a party is ordered to proceed with
an arbitration outside the State and the arbitration is had in the other
state, it seems clear that there will be no occasion or opportunity for
the arbitrators sitting in the other state to invoke or use § 166 of the
Pennsylvania statute; the arbitral board will have recourse to such
comparable remedies (including, of course, limitations upon subpoenas
of out-of-state witnesses) as the law of the forum may afford.
With respect to the significance of §§ 170 and 171 on the question
at hand the Supreme Court reported the position taken by the court
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below by quoting from its opinion as follows: "Furthermore, sections
10 [§ 170] and 11 [§ 171] indicate that the court should have jurisdic-
tion over the arbitrators themselves. Section 10 provides that 'where
an award is vacated . . . the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.' Should this situation later arise, and
we should direct a rehearing, we would have no means of enforcing
such an order. The legislature certainly never intended that the court
should issue a useless order, and it further indicates that the act refers
only to cases where the arbitration is proceeding within the State of
Pennsylvania. The same reasoning applies to section 11 [§ 171] which
provides that 'the court may modify and correct the award or re-
submit the matter to the arbitrators.' "
To these considerations the Supreme Court replied: "If we assume
that all these difficulties are possibilities, defendant is not helped. It
was bound to know the law, and yet, notwithstanding that, agreed, for
a valuable consideration, to the arbitration out of which these difficulties
are conjured. Suppose, as here, the jurisdictional county was Dela-
ware, and the arbitrators chose to sit in Erie, nearly all of the difficulties
suggested would exist, exactly as if they were sitting in New York,
and in many respects the annoyances would be greater. . . . The
proceeding in the court below is, in effect, a bill for specific performance
of the arbitration provisions of the contracts (Red Cross Line v. Atlan-
tic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 124), and the scope of the chancellor's
power in that character of case is probably broad enough to overcome
all such difficulties." (Italics supplied.) Just what the Supreme Court
meant by "the jurisdictional county" in the precise illustration which
it posed is not clear. It is not clear how Delaware might be "the juris-
dictional county" for any pertinent purpose under the statute after
arbitrators had been appointed and were duly convened in hearing
in Erie.79 But to return to the general views of the lower court: It
seems first to have assumed that in event of an out-of-state arbitration
and award, the losing party would not, or could not, have recourse
to the remedies provided by the law of that state to vacate or to modify
or correct the award. This was a speculative and unwarranted assump-
tion. Again, apparently that court expected that the losing party would
invoke the statutory procedure under the Pennsylvania arbitration
statute to vacate or modify or correct the foreign award rather than
common law remedies. This assumption is equally speculative.80 The
79. See Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, 5 Puxvox § 178.
80. In Britex Waste Co., v. Nathan Schwab & Sons, Inc., 139 Pa. Super. 474,
12 A.2d 473 (1939), the award of a default arbitration in England was enforced in
an action of assumpsit on the award.
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lower court also seems to have overlooked the fact that the provision
in § 170 for directing a rehearing by the arbitrators when an award
is vacated, gives discretion to the Court to direct or not direct such
rehearing. Full regard for this discretionary power should have dissi-
pated the Court's concern about the issuance of useless orders in such
cases.
The arbitration statute provides in its first section (§ 161) that
arbitration agreements which qualify thereunder, including provisions
in written contracts to arbitrate future disputes arising in connection
therewith, "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." This means,
in effect, that the courts of the state shall make them enforceable. The
remedies for so doing are made explicit in subsequent sections, includ-
ing § 163 which provides for the specific enforcement of such arbitra-
tion agreements "in accordance with the terms of the agreement." It
can scarcely be denied that the arbitration provision in the foregoing
case carried a term requiring the arbitration to be held in New York.
In view of these considerations, there seems to be much merit in
the Supreme Court's over-all statement in reversing the lower Court's
view that the arbitration statute relates only to arbitrations to be held
in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court's statement was as follows:
"The statute does not say so, and the argument brought forward to
show that under sections 6, 10 and 11 [§ 166, 170, 171] that conclu-
sion must be implied, is not only both labored and inconclusive, but
also wholly overlooks other sections of the act. Moreover, it ignores
the legal principle that it is our duty to sustain the act, if this can rea-
sonably be done, and not to destroy it either in whole or in part."
In an earlier case, Katakura & Co. Ltd. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery
Co.,)" the Court had expressly passed by the question whether or not
out-of-state arbitrations might be ordered under the statute. It there
held that since the arbitration clause did not clearly require out-of-state
arbitration, arbitration would be ordered within the state. In this case
the seller, a Japanese corporation with an office in New York City, en-
tered into a contract of sale with the respondent, a Pennsylvania corpo-
ration with its principal office in Philadelphia. Disputes arose between
the parties and the seller petitioned for an order against the respondent
to proceed with arbitration. The arbitration provision declared that
disputes arising in connection with the contract "must be settled by
arbitration to be conducted in the manner provided by the by-laws, rules
and regulations of the Silk Association of America, Inc., governing
arbitration." The Court reported that the arbitration provision fur-
81. 307 Pa. 544, 161 At. 529 (1932).
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ther provided that "Hearings shall be held customarily at Association
Headquarters where adequate room will be provided;" and that: "This
Arbitration shall be governed by the arbitration law of New York and
the Arbitration Rules of the Silk Association of America, Inc." It held
that the lower court had jurisdiction to determine whether or not arbi-
tration should be ordered in New York or elsewhere, and, since the
arbitration provision did not require the arbitration to be held in New
York, it should be ordered in Pennsylvania. "This arbitration," said
the Court, "may be conducted in Pennsylvania in the manner provided
by the by-laws, rules and regulations of the Silk Association of Amer-
ica, Inc., governing arbitration so far as they are not inconsistent with
the laws of Pennsylvania and with the rules of the appropriate court
of common pleas concerning procedure and practice under the Pennsyl-
vania Arbitration Act, and subject to all the other pertinent provisions
of that act." 82
RIGHT OF HEARING-QUORUM-Ex PARTE INVESTIGATIONS
In Seaboard Surety Co. v. Commonwealth I a motion to vacate
an award alleged that the arbitrators "did not," to quote the Court,
"hear the testimony or sit together as a Board to consider it." The
Court held that if the motion was proved true, the award should be
vacated for misbehavior of the arbitrators. The Court declared that
an arbitral proceeding "is in the nature of a judicial inquiry, and in-
volves, ordinarily, a hearing and all that is hereby implied. . . Sec-
tion 6 [§ 166] of the statute expressly requires that all of them [the
arbitrators] shall sit at the hearing of the case, unless by consent in
writing all parties agree to proceed with a less number." 84
The foregoing motion further alleged, to quote the Court, "that
after the hearings were concluded the arbitrators commissioned the
State Geologist to make a laboratory analysis of samples of test borings,
that the geologist made his report to the arbitrators more than a year
and a half before their decision was rendered, but no opportunity was
afforded plaintiff to examine the report until after the award had been
made, and that plaintiff was deprived of its right to cross-examine the
State Geologist on his report or to introduce evidence to explain or con-
contradict it." Indicating that motion to vacate on this ground was
well conceived and within the jurisdiction of the court below the Su-
preme Court said: "Furthermore, it is well established that they [arbi-
82. The Court had previously noted the similarity between the New York and
Pennsylvania arbitration statutes.
83. Supra, note 52.
84. Accord as to the requirement of quorum, Kuzman v. Karnilen, supra note 7.
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trators] should not proceed independently, and without notice to the
parties, to make personal inquiries or investigations upon which they
intend to base their award." "
In subsequent proceedings upon the petition to vacate the fore-
going views were reaffirmed and the award was vacated.86
In this second court suit the Commonwealth's answer to the peti-
tion to vacate raised a further issue. It set forth allegations to the effect
that the geologist's investigation was made only after the arbitrators
already had come to their decision upon the matters covered in the
investigation. From this it was argued that the ex parte investigation
did no harm because it had no effect upon the making of the award
and, therefore, was no cause to vacate the award. The lower court
overruled this argument as follows: "That the report may or may not
have been used as a basis for the award is immaterial." 87
The Supreme Court, however, has left the matter in some doubt.
Early in the opinion the Court commented as follows: "An award may
be properly set aside for misconduct of the arbitrators if after the hear-
ings are at an end they receive testimony or evidence on behalf of one
of the parties without notice to the other. This rule is generally quali-
fied by the requirement that there has been no possibility of injury to
the offended party." 88 (Italics supplied.) Whatever may have been
the intent of the last quoted sentence, the authorities cited do not seem to
justify a departure from the precise ruling of the court below. The
Supreme Court further observed: "It is clear that the action of the
arbitrators in securing an independent report on a matter at issue con-
stitutes misconduct within the meaning of the arbitration act. It can-
not be seriously contended that appellee was not injured as a result
of the acts of the arbitrators." (Italics supplied.) But does this mean
that the ruling of the lower court is adopted or rejected? This question
is further involved in the following views of the Court by which the
opinion expressly purports to dispose of the appellant's contention "that
the report of the state geologist in no way affected the decision of the
Board" and was, therefore, innocuous. In this connection the Court
made the point that the appellant's averment that the arbitrators
had made their decision upon the matter involved in the report before
85. Here the Court cited and quoted from the famous case of Berizzi Co. v.
Krausz, 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436 (1925).
86. Seaboard Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 54 Dauphin 95 (1943); 350 Pa.
87, 38 A.2d 58 (1944).
87. That this appears to be the prevailing common law view, see STURGES, op.
cit. supra note 7, § 217.
88. The court's authorities, "3 Am. Jur. pgs. 933, 966; Curran v. Philadelphia,
264 Pa. 111, 119."
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the geologist made his investigation and that it was not used as the
basis of the decision in the award was "inconsistent with paragraph
twelve of its answer wherein it avers that the decision was prepared
only after the Board of Arbitrators met and considered the testimony."
The Court then cited matters of fact in the case from which the conclu-
sion was deduced that the board could not have arrived at a decision
before the report was filed. The Court thereupon seemed to drop fur-
ther consideration of the foregoing contention by the appellant. It is
not made clear what bearing the Court's discussion of the foregoing
inconsistency in the appellant's averments in its answer had upon that
contention.
The Court entered next upon a quite confusing commentary upon
the case as follows: "If it is assumed that they [the arbitrators] did not
read the report as part of the testimony in the case then appellee's allega-
tion that the arbitrators who made the award did not consider the testi-
mony and merely adopted an opinion of their predecessors is true."
(Italics supplied.) How this report, so improperly received, came to be
rated as "testimony in the case" is not apparent; and the remoteness of
this statement from any issue presented by the parties seems quite
apparent. The Court then concluded: "Appellant [Appellee, it seems]
by its averments has established misconduct by the arbitrators in con-
sidering ex parte evidence upon a fundamental issue of fact without
the consent of appellee and by reason of the failure of the Board of
Arbitrators to study the testimony and arrive at a conclusion based
thereon." (Italics supplied.) Superficially it appears that it should
be concluded from these remarks that the Court intended as follows:
the initiation of the ex parte investigation by the geologist and
the acceptance of his report constituted misconduct by the arbitrators
and cause to vacate the award, but if the arbitrators did not take account
of it as "testimony in the case" and "arrive at a conclusion based
thereon," they were guilty of misconduct. Such contrariety cannot
be justified, and it may be doubted that it was really intended. But
what was really intended does not appear.
At all events, the order of the lower court vacating the award was
affirmed and its concise ruling: "That the report may or may not have
been used as a basis for the award is immaterial," was not declared by
the Supreme Court to be reversed.
It seems clear from this review that the Supreme Court, by its
decisions, and the Legislature, by inadequacies in draftsmanship, have
failed to facilitate arbitration under the arbitration statute of 1927. It
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also seems probable that these impedimenta to statutory arbitration
may best be overcome by amendatory legislation. Legislative action is
necessary to revise § 171 (d) and eliminate judicial review of arbitra-
tions and awards which is now based on analogy between award and
verdict. Probably legislative amendment is the surest recourse to
eliminate the limitations upon arbitrability voiced in Goldstein v. Gar-
ment Workers' Union. Unless and until these two matters in parti-
cular are clarified, the Pennsylvania arbitration statute is scarcely invit-
ing to parties who would arbitrate or use arbitration agreements in
Pennsylvania.
